When users have ex-ante demands over a common resource and when resource size is not sufficient to cover all the individual demands, there is a need to establish a rationing rule. I test whether the choice of the rationing rule impacts the individual decision to self-insure, i.e. to invest in a secure alternative resource, instead of relying on a free but uncertain common resource. Four rationing rules, empirically relevant for water management, are compared using a laboratory experiment. According to Nash predictions, the investment in self-insurance is the same with the four rules. However, the experimental data show that agents' decisions are impacted by the rule. Coordination on the optimal self-insurance level is higher with the no allocation rule. However, total gains are higher with the constrained-equal awards rule, and their variability is reduced. Rules which are defined as a proportion of posted demands, such as the proportional and constrained-equal losses rules, induce sub-optimal levels of self-insurance.
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Introduction
Water resources are often managed through the -formal or informal -allocation of access rights or use licenses to users. They can be granted equally to all water users, granted on an explicit basis such as land-holding size or crop water requirements, or auctioned-off and made tradeable on a water market (Dayton Johnson (2003) ). In France, licences are granted to farmers according to their posted demands. Farmers are expected to post a demand corresponding to their irrigation needs for the coming year. Ex-ante demands are not constrained, i.e farmers receive most often a volumetric licence corresponding to their demand and are authorized to withdraw the corresponding water volume. However, because water availability is stochastic, and because farmers don't know the needs of the other farmers when posting their demands, a situation of resource shortage can arise (Ambec (2008) , Ansink and Weikard (2009) ). When water flows are too low to fulfill ex-ante demands, there is a need to establish a rationing rule defining the share of the total resource allocated to each user.
1
In France, irrigation water is shared through a system of temporary restrictions, managed and controlled by public authorities.
Under these rationing schemes, users face the risk of getting a lower quantity of the common resource than planned and demanded. As a result, when the possibility exists, they may want to diversify their resource use: they can reduce their dependence on the free (but risky) common resource by investing into a costly (but safer) substitute resource, which constitutes a self-insurance against common resource shortage (Ehrlich and Becker (1972) ). Farmers can partially secure their access to irrigation water by investing into farm storage or groundwater pumping equipment, or by signing delivery contracts with water companies guaranteeing pressurized water. Agents decide individually on their level of self-insurance, in order to find the right balance between economic losses due to the risk of water shortage and investment costs in alternative safe resources. However, in most of the French river basins, when farmers are taking up those opportunities, they agree to forego a proportion of their ex ante demand on the river water. Therefore, by relying more on private resources, they relieve the collective pressure on the river and reduce the probability that total demand exceeds total availability, mitigating as well the severity of shortage when it occurs. This situation creates strategic interactions between farmers, likely to lead to a situation of suboptimal investment in selfinsurance. Since the rationing rule determines the share of resource allocated to each agent in case of shortage, it is likely to affect farmers' decisions concerning investment in more secure resources. In light of the collective action nature of the problem (Coman (1911) , Ostrom (2011)) , it is useful to identify the most efficient coordination institution among the rationing rules. This paper compares the rationing rules as coordination institutions toward the optimal level of self-insurance.
France is presently implementing a water law reform in order to adjust irrigation water management to the increased frequency of drought. One of the aspects of the reform is the redefinition of the restriction rules in drought time. The inherent inertia of a social system makes extremely difficult any prediction of water users' reactions to policy change in the water allocation scheme (Goetz et al. (2008) ). Given the high cost and imprecise measurement associated to the collection of field data (with the implementation of pilot experiments, for example), alternative methods are required for assessing the performance of various rationing rules. Experimentation provides a mean to test the instruments at a lower cost. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to analyze how the rationing rule impacts the individual trade-off between relying on a free but uncertain common resource and investing in a secure alternative resource. As the impact of the rationing rule on selfinsurance decisions has not being investigated previously in the experimental literature, I rely on a pure laboratory experiment (unframed, with undergraduate students), likely to provide insights for more general problems on resource management under uncertainty.
Surprisingly, the experimental literature on common pool resource (CPR) game with uncertain resource size has focused on the case where no resource is allocated if the resource size is not sufficient to cover all the posted demands (Budescu et al. (1995) ). The justification of this rule is that the overuse of a resource can totally destroy its value. I use this rule as a reference (thereafter named "no allocation rule"). However, in many real-world examples, access to the scarce resource is not prohibited but only restricted according to a predefined rationing rule. For example, in 23 of the 31 self-governed Mexican irrigation societies studied by Dayton-Johnson, water is allocated proportionally to land-holding but switch to an equal division of irrigation supply in years of acute water scarcity (Dayton Johnson (1999 ). Similarly, the administrative procedure used historically in France is a restriction of allowed irrigation times (for example left bank farmers are allowed to irrigate on the first two days of the week, and right bank farmers are allocated the last two days). In these two examples, water restrictions are organized on an exogenous basis, independently from volumetric licences. Proportional rationing is also frequently practiced. In the French river basins that have adopted volumetric management of water, the volumes specified in the water use licenses are reduced in proportion of the overall amount of seasonal water available during the events of water shortage (Loubier et al. (2005) ). The contract between the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission and its wholesale customers for potable water also explicitly stipulates a proportional rationing rule (Schroyen and Oyenuga (2011) ).
Despite the large empirical evidence on the variety of rationing rules, very few experimental papers have considered alternative rationing rules. For example, in Walker and Gardner (1992) , the payoff from the CPR depends on aggregate investment into the CPR and on the appropriator investment as a percentage of the aggregate, which can be interpreted as a proportional rationing rule. The experiment presented here enables to explore this idea further and compare four rules on the basis of their impact on coordination around the optimal investment in self-insurance, efficiency (total gains) and reliability (variability of total gains): the proportional rule, divides the resource available proportionally to individual posted demands, the constrained equal-awards rule shares the resource equally amongst claimants, subject to the condition that no one receives more than his posted demand, the constrained equal-losses rule focuses on the losses incurred and shares the losses equally between claimants, subject to the condition that no user ends up with a negative amount of resource, the no allocation rule allocates no resource in case of shortage.
2 These rules are simplified representation of water allocation practices observed in the fields. Proportional rationing is frequently practiced as mentioned above. The constrained-equal awards rule is an example of rule where water is allocated on an exogenous basis, independently from volumetric licences. The constrained-equal losses rule has no direct application in the fields but it is interesting as it shares characteristics with the constrained-equal awards rule (the losses are shared equally) and the proportional rule (allocation depends on ex-ante demand). The no allocation rule captures the idea of total interdiction. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design implemented to compare the rules with respect to their impact on the self-insurance decisions of the agents. Results are presented in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Experimental design
The experiment reported in this paper compares the rationing rules on the basis of their impact on the trade-off between relying on a free but risky common resource and a costly but safe resource. The experiment is based on a common pool resource request game with uncertain resource size where subjects can also have access to an alternative resource (as in Walker and Gardner (1992) and Keser and Gardner (1999) ). The decision task is to post a demand to the two available resources. The rationing rule used when total demand for the common resource exceeds available supply is the treatment variable. I present more precisely the game and the associated predictions, as well as the experimental procedure in the next sections. Instructions are available in appendix B.
Description of the game
Each subject has to post a total demand of 20 units and can allocate it between a common resource of uncertain size (denoted account B) and a safe private alternative (denoted account A). The individual demand of agent i to the common resource is denoted b i , with 0 ≤ b i ≤ 20. The demand to the safe resource is the complementary decision: 20 − b i . Subjects are 2 The names of the first three rules are borrowed from the bankruptcy literature. The bankruptcy literature provides well-behaved and acceptable sharing rules in bankruptcy situations in order to award the remaining resources of a bankrupt firm between its creditors (Aumann and Maschler (1985) , Herrero and Villar (2001) , Moulin (2001) ). Water allocation and river sharing problems can be compared to bankruptcy problems: while creditors face the risk of loosing their capital investment when the firm's profits are too low, agricultural water users bear the risk of not receiving water, whereas they have made production plans requiring water use, when existing water rights cannot be fulfilled because of low available flows (Ansink and Weikard (2009) The characteristics of each account are as follows. Each unit received yields a payoff of 1 Euro (payoffs are given directly in Euros; no experimental currency is used). All the units requested to account A are received with certainty but it is required to pay a per-unit cost of c = 0.2 Euros. The number of units received from account B by a subject depends both on his posted demand to B, the aggregate demand to B and the random draw of the total number of units. Denote x the total number of units available from account B. x takes two values l = 12 and h = 40 units with equal probability.
4 If the resource size is compatible with the total demand (B ≤ x), each agent receives the number of units claimed. Otherwise, if (B > x), rationing is organized with a rule, i.e. a function θ(b, x) that associates a division of the resource x between the claimants. θ i (b, x) is the number of units of the common resource allocated to agent i in case of shortage. Both low resource size and high demands can create a situation where rationing is necessary. Therefore, the common resource is not a CPR in the pure sense as exclusion is possible (Ostrom et al. (1994) ). I assume rationing rules can be perfectly enforced.
The subjects face the following trade-off. Units requested to account B yields a better payoff if they are received because the units claimed to B are free. On the other hand, increasing the number of units demanded to B reduces the likelihood that these units are received (because it increases the probability and severity of shortage).
The rationing rules selected as treatment variables write as:
The proportional rule (PROP): θ
Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted at the University of Montpellier experimental lab (LEEM) with a total of 156 subjects drawn from the undergraduate student population. 2 sessions for each treatment have been conducted, with 10 pairs in each session, resulting in 20 independent observations per treatment (there are less subjects in one session, see Table 1 for details). Care was taken to ensure that no subject participate in more than one session. Common knowledge of the rules of the game was implemented by reading aloud the instructions. Based on exit survey of the 156 persons which participated, 55% were female and the average age was 20 years. Average earnings were 20.2 Euros, including a show up fee and their payments for their play in the experiment with a duration of two hours. The individual minimum and maximum earnings were 5 Euros and 28 Euros respectively.
[ Table 1 here ] Subjects were randomly divided into fixed pairs. Interactions were restricted to simultaneous decisions via computer terminals. No communication between subjects was allowed. The players had complete information about the payoff function for each player and the values of all parameters. In the beginning of each period, the two players simultaneously and independently made their decisions. Before the subjects could start the experiment, they had to go through a number of instructions which were followed by a quiz. They could only start when all quiz questions were answered correctly. The same pair of two players interacted during all the 20 periods (two sessions have only 10 periods). In order to avoid hedging behaviors and end-of-the game effect, I used a "unknown horizon rule", i.e. I told the subjects that the game will be repeated but I did not tell them the exact number of periods (?). I simply informed them when it was the end of the experiment.
On top of deciding on their demands to the two accounts, subjects had to declare the number of units they expect the other player to request to B in each period. At the end of each period, each player learned the difference between his predictionb −i and the demand of the other player to the common resource b −i , as well as his gain from this prediction. Belief elicitation allows to examine the source of deviations from equilibrium behavior and help distinguish between failure to best respond to prediction and failure to predict. Belief elicitation was incentivized with a scoring rule defined such that the closer a subject's prediction from the actual posted demand, the higher his payoff (Croson (2000) , Gachter and Renner (2010) ). Subjects earned 20 Euros if their guess was exactly right. If their guess was a bit off, they earned 18 Euros divided by the absolute distance between their prediction and the true demand of the other.
At any time during the game, subjects could use a simulator to compute their gains in each state of nature. They needed to enter their demand and their prediction about the other's demand in the simulator. They could also look at the history of the game. At the end of each period, each player was informed about the total demand to the CPR and about his gains in the two possible states of nature (12 or 40 units available from the CPR). I did not draw the state of nature in each period in order to avoid wealth effects. The draw of the state of nature (12 or 40) was realized at the end of the experiment only for the decision selected for payment. I used a random lottery choice payment procedure, where I randomly payed for a single situation, either for the accuracy of subjects' prediction or the payoff associated with the decision task, for a single period. The random-lottery incentive system has become the almost exclusive incentive system for individual choice, and numerous studies have used and tested it (Starmer and Sugden (1991) , Hey and Lee (2005) , Lee (2008) ). Moreover, paying randomly either for the accuracy of subjects' prediction or pay the payoff associated with the game outcome makes hedging no longer possible -high earnings in the tasks related to the game studied cannot compensate for low earnings in the prediction task, or vice versa- (Blanco et al. (2010) ).
Prior to the CPR game, I elicited two types of risk preferences: exogenous risk aversion and aversion to strategic uncertainty. Risk aversion has been shown to have significant impact on decisions in CPR game (Budescu et al. (1995) , Chermak and Krause (2002) ) as well as in coordination game (Heinemann et al. (2009) ). I elicit risk aversion in a lottery-choice task derived from the investment game to capture the sensitivity of subjects to exogenous risk (Gneezy and Potters (1997) , Charness and Gneezy (2010) ). I have also elicited subjects' aversion to strategic uncertainty with a coordination game framed in a similar way as the exogenous risk aversion elicitation task (see Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Heinemann et al. (2009) for similar procedures). The more averse to strategic uncertainty is a subject, the less he is willing to choose the option that requires coordination, as the other can be considered as a source of uncertainty. Table 3 presents the results of the two preference elicitation tasks. The decisions in the exogenous risk aversion and strategic uncertainty aversion elicitation tasks are two of the 22 decisions that can be selected for payment at the end of the experiment.
I controlled for order effects by having sessions where the risk task was run before the strategic task (RS) and vice versa (SR) ( Table 1 ) . I find a significant order effect for the risk aversion task: subjects are significantly less risk averse if they play the risk task after the strategic task (two sided Mann Whitney test p value=0.026). One possible explanation is that subjects are more risk averse in the first task because they have no experimental gains yet (assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion). On the contrary, the subjects who had played the risk task in the second phase knew their gains in the strategic game and therefore adjust their risk aversion to this level of expected experimental wealth. This explanation assumes the existence of a "narrow bracketing effect", i.e. subjects evaluate decisions in the light of their gains in the game rather than their wealth in real life (Schechter (2007) ). However, there is no significant order effect for the strategic task (two sided Mann Whitney test p value=0.857). It can be explained by the fact that the subjects who played to the strategic uncertainty task in the second phase could not take into account their gains in the first task (the risk task) as the draw of the state of nature was realized only at the end of the experiment and therefore they only knew their expected gains.
Theoretical predictions
I present the equilibrium and optimum demand to the common resource. The level of selfinsurance is the complementary choice in order to reach a total demand of 20 units per subject (20 − b i ). The game is solved as a finite game, and assuming the choice is continuous (but the decision is a discrete choice -integer between 0 and 20-in the experiment).
The objective function of each agent i = 1, 2 is equal to the expected payoff given by:
The optimal risk-neutral solution to the game maximizes total pair gain given by:
Maximizing the total pair gain over B, one finds that the optimum solution is a total demand to the common resource equal to l (provided c <
2
). Any division of this total demand between the two agents is optimal. This result stands for any rationing rule θ.
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solution of the game b
2 ) is a profile of posted demands to B such that for each risk neutral player i = 1, 2:
For a risk-neutral expected profit maximizer agent, the first-order conditions are:
With the parameters of the experiment (c = 0.2), the four rules lead to the same aggregate Nash equilibrium B * = l, which is also the optimum of the game. Assuming CRRA utility function, the same result holds under risk aversion (proof in Appendix A). This aggregate Nash equilibrium is compatible with multiple vectors of individual demands (Table 2 gives all the equilibria of the game for each rule). Therefore, the game is a coordination problem where each player must make the complementary choice to the other player in order to reach the aggregate Nash equilibrium, which is a total demand equals to the lowest quantity available from account B (l).
[ Table 2 here ] According to the Nash equilibrium predictions, the rationing rule has no impact on the use of the common resource and self-insurance at the group level. However, because the use of the Nash equilibrium concept to predict individual behaviors has been challenged by experimental data in coordination games (Heinemann et al. (2009) ), as well as in CPR games (Walker and Gardner (1992) , Keser and Gardner (1999) ), it is useful to verify if this theoretical prediction is supported by experimental data. Indeed, I find that coordination success is higher with the no allocation rule but total gains are higher (and their variability is reduced) with the constrained-equal awards rule. Rules defined as a proportion of posted demands, such as the proportional and the constrained-equal losses rules, induce sub-optimal investments in alternative safe resources, lead to lower and more variable gains. Evidences of these results are presented in the next section.
Results
I first present the results at the pair level, in order to compare the rules on the basis of their overall performance. Then, I present the results at the individual level, in order to understand the drivers of the overall results. For each indicator, I first consider some descriptive results on the effect of the rule and examine the differences across rules using nonparametric MannWhitney U tests with exactly one summary statistic value for each pair in each treatment. When relevant, I also report results from multivariate regression models which evaluate the contribution of different factors and enable to control for potentially confounding co-variates.
Prior to examining the relative performance of the rules, it is necessary to perform some robustness checks in order to test wether the characteristics of our experimental design can have influenced our results. Table 6 column 1 presents the results from a random effects generalized least squares regression, where the dependent variable is individual claim to B. I rely on a tobit regression as the claims to B are left-censored at zero and right-censored at 20. The regression includes several dummies to take into account the design characteristics of each experimental session (rule, order of the elicitation tasks, number of periods). I find that there is no significant difference in the individual claim to B between the 10 periods and 20 periods sessions, neither between the sessions where the risk elicitation task preceded the strategic uncertainty task and the other order. Therefore, all the data all pooled for the analysis.
3.1 Overall performance of the rules: results at the pair level I first compare the rules according to their performance as coordination devices towards the optimal demand to the common resource. I then compare the total gains and their variability for each rule.
Coordination on total optimal demand
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the median total demand to B in a pair over all periods. The use of the median (rather than the mean) is favored in order to reduce the impact of large deviations from the optimal demand observed in very few groups. The NA rule leads to a median total demand closer to the optimum than the other rules in the first period. After 10 periods, the median total demand converges toward the optimal solution with the rule CEA as well. The deviation from optimum remains positive for the CEL and PROP rule in the last period. According to the Mann-Whitney U tests, the median total demand is significantly lower for the NA rule compared to each of the three other rules but there is no significant difference across the other rules ( Table 3 and 4 ). I provide additional results from multivariate regression models which evaluate the impact of the rule on the pairs' decisions. Table 5 column 1 presents the results from a random effects generalized least squares regression, where the dependent variable is the absolute difference between the observed total demand and the optimal total demand (12 units). I rely on a tobit regression as the deviation of total demand to account B are left-censored at zero when optimum is reached and right-censored at 28 (40-12=28). The regression includes treatment dummies as explanatory variables, omitting the dummy corresponding to the NA rule. I find that deviation from optimal demand is significantly higher with the PROP and CEL rules, but there is no significant difference between the CEA and the NA rule. Overall, the deviation from optimal demand reduces over time (as suggested by the negative sign of the period variable) but the learning effect occurs at a decreasing rate (positive sign of the squared period variable).
[ Figure 1 , Table 3, Table 4 , Table 5 here ]
The same pattern is observed by comparing the frequency of optimal demand to B, higher for the NA rule, followed by the CEA, PROP and CEL rules ( Table 3 ). In the first period, 4 pairs out of 20 have reached the optimal demand with the NA rule, 3/20 pairs with CEA, 2/18 pairs with CEL and 1/20 pair with PROP. In the last period, 11 pairs out of 20 have reached the optimal demand with the NA rule, 10/20 pairs in CEA, 5/18 pairs in CEL and 7/20 pair in PROP. It confirms the catch-up of the CEA rule over time whereas the higher frequency of coordination failure remains with the CEL and PROP rules. Figure 2 presents the percentage of groups where pairs deviate positively (total demand >12), negatively (total demand <12) and do not deviate (total demand =12) from optimal demand for the last 10 periods (each group appears 10 times). The CEA rule and the NA rule have the highest frequency of optimal demand and the lowest frequency total demand higher than optimal. However, the NA rule has the highest frequency of lower than optimal demands (30%). The risk of shortage is reduced with the NA rule but it provides too strong incentives to selfinsure to the subjects. The CEL rule creates heterogeneous reactions among subjects: total demand to B is higher than optimal in 49% of the cases, but it is also lower than optimal in 27% of the cases.
[ Figure 2 here ]
Total gains
The median total gains over all periods are higher with the CEA and NA rules but they are not significantly different across rules according to the rank sum test presented in Table 4 . Table 5 presents further results, with a random effects generalized least squares regression, where the dependent variable is the total gains in a pair (the average between total gains if head is drawn and total gains if tail is drawn). Unsurprisingly, the lower the deviation from optimal claim, the higher the total gains (Table 5 column 3 ). Rules appears to have a significant impact after controlling for the absolute deviation from optimal demand: for the same amount of deviation from optimal demand, the gains are significantly higher with the CEL, CEA and PROP rules. These rules lead to higher total gains when subjects fail to coordinate on the total optimal demand as they enable to always allocate the available resource. On the contrary, resource is wasted and gains reduced with the NA rule. However, without controlling for deviation from optimal claim, the gains are not significantly different across rules (Table 5 column 2 ). Indeed, even if gains are lower with the NA rule in case of coordination failure, gains are not significantly impacted because coordination failure is less frequent than with the other rules as shown in section 3.1.1.
Variability of total gains
Another important feature to take into account is the variability of gains, which gives an insight on the reliability of instruments (Cochard et al. (2005) ). The regulator in charge of choosing a rationing rule may not only be interested in a rule with high average performance, but also in a rule which leads to foreseeable and reliable outcomes. The standard deviation of total gains, taken as a measure of variability, is the highest for the NA rule and the lowest for the CEL rule ( Table 3 ) . The difference between the NA and the CEL rule is significant (test of equality of variance Table 4 ). I take into account two distinct dimensions for gains variability: first, gains can differ between groups at a given period, and second, gains can differ between periods in a given group. The former measure is related to "inter-group" variability, while the latter is related to "inter-period" variability. For computing inter-group variability, I calculate the standard deviation of gains between groups in period t. Interperiod variability in group i is equal to the standard deviation of gains of this group over all periods. With the NA rule, as no resource is allocated when the resource size is low if the total demand is higher than the resource available, the difference of gains between the scenario l and h is bigger comparatively to the other rules, and therefore we can expect higher inter-period variability. However, in the experiment, I find that most of the variance is due to inter-group variability (as opposed to inter-period variability). The NA rule is the worse rule in term of reliability as it has both higher inter-group and inter-period variability (Figure 4 ).
[ Figure 4 here ] To summarize, the no allocation and constrained-equal awards rules lead to higher coordination level but total gains are higher (and their variability lower) with the latter. In the next section, we present further analysis at the individual level in order to explain this result.
3.2 Drivers of the differences between rules: results at the individual level Coordination success at the pair level depends on two factors at the individual level: i) the ability to predict accurately the other player's behavior; ii) the ability to best respond, i.e. to choose a demand such that the the best aggregate outcome (a total demand of 12 units) is reached, taking into account the prediction on the other's demand. We first analyze prediction error and best-response at the individual level. Then, we search for potential determinants of the difference across rules found.
The role of prediction error and best response
I find that prediction errors (measured as the difference between the prediction on the other's demand to B and the observed demand of the other) are not significantly different across rules (except CEL) (Table 6 column 2). However, I find that the rules have a significant impact on the deviation from the best response demands, where the best response demand to B is equal to the difference in absolute value between the total optimal demand (12) and the prediction on the other's demand to B. Table 6 column 3 presents estimates from a random effects regression model on the magnitude of deviation from the best-response demand. It shows that the amount of deviation (in absolute value) is significantly higher with the CEL, PROP and CEA rules compared to the NA rule. Similar results (not reported but available on request) are obtained when we explain the probability of best-responding by a probit model. The estimated probability to best respond is significantly lower with the CEL, CEA and PROP rules as compared to the reference (NA).
In order to explain this result, I analyse how the subjects adapt their demand to their prediction. Whereas the payment procedure aims at reducting the interactions between the belief elicitation and demand decision tasks, we find a significant correlation between both decisions (Table 6 column 1) . Moreover, we find that the impact of the prediction on the individual decision differs significantly across rules, as suggested by the significance of the interactions variables Prediction x Rule. For the NA rule (reference, captured by the variable "Prediction"), I find that the individual demand is negatively correlated with the prediction, therefore suggesting that subjects' adapt their own demand to B to their prediction, in order to reduce the probability that total demand is higher than number of units available in B. On the contrary, with the CEA, CEL and PROP rules, the individual demand of each subject significantly increase with their prediction. We present in the next paragraphs some possible explanations for this result.
[ Table 6 here ]
The determinants of coordination success
According to Devetag and Ortmann (2007) survey, prominent structural determinant of coordination success are the type and strength of deviation costs, as well as the coordination requirements, partly determined by the number of equilibria. Some cognitive and behavioral determinants, less easily controlable by the experimenter and therefore less studied in the literature, can also be responsible for the treatment effects. In the following, I analyse the role of the number of Nash equilibria, the cost of deviation from the coordination outcome, the degree of manipulability of the rule as well as the impact of individual risk preferences.
Multiple equilibria
Multiple equilibria increase strategic uncertainty and the probability of coordination failure (Van Huyck et al. (1990) ). The unicity of Nash equilibrium for the CEA rule is expected to facilitate coordination, whereas the three other rules have multiple equilibria. However, I find that there is no correlation between the number of theoretical equilibria and coordination success (coefficient: -0.0125, significance: 0.64). The CEA rule has both a unique equilibrium and high levels of coordination success, but the NA rule achieves even higher coordination levels whereas it has multiple equilibria. 44% of the observations are optimal with the NA rule over all periods and 30% with the CEA rule. Moreover, despite the NA and CEL rules have the same number of equilibria (13), they result in different rates of coordination success (44% for NA and 22% for CEL). For the PROP rule, there are three equilibria and 27% of the observations are optimal.
The existence of a focal point can explain why the number of equilibria is not impacting coordination. A focal point represents a natural outcome for the game: if participants believe that others will focus on one of the Nash equilibria, it becomes the outcome of their interaction (Schelling (1960) ). A natural focal point for the game, if subjects are averse to inequality, is sharing equally the total equilibrium demand among the two participants (b 1 ; b 2 ) = (6; 6). This is the unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium. It corresponds to a Nash equilibrium for all rules: it is the unique Nash equilibrium for the CEA rule and the risk dominant equilibrium for the PROP and the NA rule. Experimental data confirm the existence of this focal point. Claiming 6 units to the common resource is the median as well as the modal choice, with 42.5% of the subjects making that choice for the NA rule, 55% for the CEA rule, 22% for the PROP rule and 25% for the CEL rule. In the first period, 8 out of 10 pairs that have converged towards the total optimal demand on the symmetric equilibrium with each subject claiming 6 units (24 out of 33 pairs in the last period -period 10 or 20 according to the sessions-). We therefore reject the hypothesis that the number of theoretical equilibria explain the differences in the coordination success across rules.
Deviation costs
The deviation cost is defined as the penalty (opportunity cost) attached to deviating from the best response. The magnitude of deviation costs can play a role in determining coordination success (Battalio et al. (2001) , Goeree and Holt (2005) , Devetag and Ortmann (2010) ). Figure  3 shows that the cost of deviation differs between the NA and the other rules. Deviation 13 from a total demand of 12 units is more costly in terms of total gains with the NA rule as no resource is allocated with probability one half if total demand is higher than l, therefore the gains are lower in case of resource shortage. The higher best response rate and the lower deviation from optimal demand with the NA rule can therefore be explained by the existence of higher deviation cost.
[ Figure 3 here ]
Degree of manipulability of the rule
Rules are manipulable when agents can influence their share of the scarce resource by signaling a larger demand, even if, by doing so, they increase the probability that there is not enough resource for both (Benassy (1977) , Schroyen and Oyenuga (2011) ). The degree of manipulability of the rule reflects in the way subjects adapt their demand to their predictions. Incentives to coordinate are lower with the PROP and CEL rules (compare to the CEA and NA rules), as these rules are manipulable. It can explain why we observe that the individual demand to the CPR increases with the prediction on the other demand (Table 6 column 1) The NA and CEA rules are not (or less) manipulable as each subject receives a fix share of the available resource (provided this share is higher than his demand in the case of the CEA rule). Surprisingly, whereas the CEA rule is less manipulable, subjects increase more their individual demands in reaction to their prediction with the CEA rule than with the CEL and PROP rules (Table 6 column 1), therefore increasing the deviation from the best-response demand (Table 6 column 3). But because the error of prediction is higher with the CEL and PROP rules, the frequency of coordination success remains higher with the CEA rule.
Behavioral and cognitive determinants
Our design enables to measure the impact of individual risk aversion and strategic uncertainty aversion. I find that the individual demand to B in the main task is negatively affected by risk and strategic uncertainty aversion (Table 6 column 1). It seems to confirm that claiming to account A is seen as an insurance by subjects, as the more risk averse they are, the more they demand to this account. This result is robust to order effect as the individual demand to B it is not significantly affected by the order of the elicitation tasks when controlling for treatments. Prediction error is significantly impacted by individual risk preferences but the effects are small and significant only for strategic uncertainty aversion (Table 6 column 2). Individual risk preferences have no significant impact on the deviation from best-response (neither exogenous risk nor strategic uncertainty aversion) (Table 6 column 3).
Cognitive determinants could also explain differences between rules. The NA and CEA rules are expected to be easier to understand, therefore reducing the cognitive demand and permitting a possibly quicker learning process is quicker. We observe that subjects significantly learn over time, but at decreasing rate. A negative sign for period means that the error and deviation from the best response reduces over time, therefore indicating learning (Table 6 column 2 and 3). The positive sign for sq-period indicates the decreasing rate of learning. Interaction variables Rule x Period show that the learning effect is different across rules. We find that learning is significantly more slowly for the CEL rule as the coefficient of the interaction variable CEL x Period is positive, therefore reducing the negative impact of period.
Conclusion
When users have ex-ante demands over a common resource and when resource size is not sufficient to cover all the individual demands, there is a need to establish a rationing rule. I have tested whether the choice of the rationing rule impacts self-insurance decisions, i.e. the individual decisions of investing in a secure alternative resource instead of relying on a free but uncertain common resource. I have compared four rules, empirically relevant for water management: the constrained-equal awards, the constrained-equal losses and the proportional rules. The no allocation rule (the traditional rule used in CPR game) has been used as a benchmark. In theory, the four rules lead to the same total demand to the common resource, the same self-insurance level and the same total gains from resource use at equilibrium. However, data collected in a laboratory experiment have provided evidences that agents' self-insurance strategies are impacted by the rationing rule.
I find that the most efficient coordination institution are the no allocation and constrainedequal awards rules but total gains are higher (and their variability lower) with the latter. The no allocation rule favors coordination as it is easy to understand and the costs of coordination failure are high. However, the total gains are reduced in case of shortage and the variability of gains is increased, as no resource is allocated in case of over-lapping demands. It illustrates the existence of a trade-off for policy-makers in charge of choosing a rationing rule: implementing a rule that will ease coordination versus finding a mechanism which always allocate the available resource, therefore increase total gains but will reduce the incentives of agents to coordinate. Rules that are defined as a proportion of demands such as the proportional and constrained-equal losses rules are manipulable and therefore induce sub-optimal investments in alternative safe resources. We observe an increase in the frequency and severity of resource shortage with these rules. According to the results presented here, the best rule (among the ones tested in this experiment) is the constrained-awards rules as i) it enables to fully allocate the resource and ii) limits strategic interactions between agents, therefore facilitating prediction of the other's demand and coordination on the total optimal demand.
The experimental results presented in this paper contributes to the experimental literature on CPR game by varying the rationing rule applied in case of resource shortage and testing its impact on self-insurance decisions. The results are also of interest for the improvement of rationing rule in the fields of water management. They suggest that policy makers in charge of the redefinition of the rationing rule in drought time (on-going reform in France) should take into account the possible impacts on farmers' risk management strategies, such as investment in on-farm storage. The work should be extended to capture further elements of the field reality and therefore increase the external validity of the results (Herberich et al. (2009) ). Using a subject pool of farmers may have an impact on coordination success and the relative efficiency of each rule because of their experience in the field of water management. Nevertheless, recent work have shown that experimental outcomes with student subjects are similar to outcomes with subjects from specific professions, such as farmers or environmental scholars (Ahn et al. (2011), Waichman and Ness (2012) ). Further work could also include an extension to bigger groups with subjects of different types within the group to see what is the best rule in an heterogeneous environment (Janssen et al. (2011) ). An other treatment could introduce the possibility for subjects to choose their demands to the secure and common resources and simultaneously decide on the rationing rule that will be applied in case of over-lapping demands (using a collective voting procedure as in Gachter and Riedl (2006) , Herrero et al. (2010) ). Such a treatment will better capture the essence of self-governance of water resources, where committees of water users are responsible for collectively defining the rationing rule simultaneously with the allocation of water licenses (Lefebvre (2011) ).
Appendix A: Nash equilibrium predictions
2 ) is a profile such that for each risk neutral player i = 1, 2:
The Nash equilibrium solution therefore depends on the sign of
NA rule:
, this expression is negative. In this case, player i's best reply function is a corner solution given by r i (b * −i ) = l − b * −i . Solving simultaneously for both agents, one finds the unique aggregate Nash equilibrium: B * = l.
CA rule:
. Player i's best reply function is a corner solution given by r i (b *
. Solving simultaneously for both agents, one finds the unique Nash equilibrium:
and therefore B * = l.
CL rule:
Player i's best reply function is a corner solution given by r i (b * −i ) = l − b * −i . Solving simultaneously for both agents, one finds the unique aggregate Nash equilibrium: B * = l.
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PROP rule:
Player i's best reply function is a corner solution given by r i (b * −i ) = l − b * −i . Solving simultaneously for both agents, one finds the unique aggregate Nash equilibrium B * = l with b * i < (1 − 2c).l ∀i. To summarize, for the value of the cost parameter chosen in the experiment c = 0.2, the four rules lead to the same aggregate Nash equilibrium B * = l. This aggregate equilibrium is compatible with multiple vectors of individual demands for some of the rules. Table 2 gives all the equilibria of the game for each rule.
Extension: Risk aversion
The equilibrium results can be extended to the case where agents are not risk-neutral (with U i a well-behaved increasing utility function with U ′ i > 0 and U ′′ i < 0)). The objective function becomes:
and the best response functions are:
> 0 for any increasing utility function.
If B > l, the sign of
depends on the relative size of
Assuming subjects have a CRRA utility function with
, with the parameters of the experiment I find
for any (α i , α j ). Therefore
Player i's best reply function is a corner solution given by r i (b * −i ) = l − b * −i . Solving simultaneously for both agents, one finds the unique Nash equilibrium: B * = l. Therefore the Nash equilibrium remains unchanged with risk aversion and is equal to B * = l for all the rules.
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Appendix B: Experimental instructions
The instructions reported are translated from French by a native French speaker who is fluent in English. The text in italics has been added to make the instructions clearer for the reader, the participants did not see this.
The experiment compounds of 3 parts. In parts 1 and 2, you'll make a unique decision. Part 3 is compounds of several periods (the exact number is not announced ) and you'll make one decision and one prediction in each period.
Earnings
You'll be paid in cash at the end of the experiment for one of your decision or prediction. This will be randomly selected by the central computer at the end of the experiment. Prior to receiving your payment, you will realize a coin flip at the experimenter desk when a random draw is necessary to calculate your final earnings.
Decision
A decision consists in claiming a total of 20 units in two accounts (A and B). You will receive units which will give you 1 Euro each. The number of units received can be lower, equal or higher than the number of units claimed. It depends on the characteristics of each account, which will be different in each part of the experiment.
You will indicate to the computer the number of units you want to claim in each account (an integer). There are 21 possibilities (A;B) where A is the number of units claimed in account A and B the number of units claimed in account B: (20;0)(19;1)(18;2)(17;3)(16;4) (15;5)(14;6)(13;7)(12;8)(11;9)(10;10)(9;11)(8;12)(7;13)(6;14)(5;15) (4;16)(3;17)(2;18)(1;19)(0;20). The computer will verify that the total is equal to 20 units when you are entering your two claims.
Next page presents the instructions of part 1. Instructions of part 2 and 3 will be distributed once part 1 has ended.
Part 1
Your decision consists in claiming a total of 20 units in two accounts (A and B). The characteristics of the two accounts are the following:
ACCOUNT A: Each unit claimed to account A has a cost of 0.2 Euro per unit. All the units claimed to account A are received.
• If " tail" is drawn, you will receive 2 units for each unit claimed in account B
• If " head" is drawn, you will receive 0 units from account B You don't know the outcome of the coin flip when you are taking your decision. You will only flip the coin at the end of the experiment if this decision is selected for payment.
The below table presents the earnings in Euros for each possible choice and for the two possible outcomes of the coin flip. Earnings are computed as follows: Tail:
Part 2 Prior to part 2, the central computer will randomly form pairs. From now, you will interact with another person in the room. You can't identify who you are interacting with. Pairs will be fixed until the end of the experiment.
Your decision consists in claiming a total of 20 units in two accounts (A and B). You and the other member of your pair will take your decisions simultaneously. The characteristics of the two accounts are the following:
ACCOUNT A: Account A is a private account. Each unit claimed to account A has a cost of 0.2 Euro per unit. All the units claimed to account A are received.
ACCOUNT B: Account B is a joint account for you and the other member of your pair.
There is no cost to claim units in account B. The number of unit received from account B depends on the total claim to account B. The total claim is equal to your claim plus the claim of the other member of your pair.
• If the total claim to B is lower or equal to 20 units, you will receive 2 units for each unit claimed in account B
• If the total claim to B is strictly higher than 20 units, you will receive 0 units from account B You don't know the decision of the other when you are taking your decision as you take your decisions simultaneously.
The below table presents the earnings in Euros for each possible choice according to the total claim to B. Your decisions are indexed by 1 (A 1 ; B 1 ) and the decisions of the other by 2 (A 2 ; B 2 ). Earnings are computed as follows:
Part 3
For each of the periods of part 3, you'll have to make one decision and one prediction. Your decision consists in claiming a total of 20 units in two accounts (A and B). You will also have to indicate your prediction concerning the number of units the other member of your pair is going to claim to account B.
The characteristics of account A and B are identical in all periods.
ACCOUNT B: Account B is a joint account for you and the other member of your pair. There is no cost to claim units in account B. The number of unit received from account B is uncertain but always lower or equal than your claim to account B.
The total number of units available from account B depends on the outcome of a coin flip.
• If "tail" is drawn, there is a total of 40 units available from account B.
There is enough units for both subjects in a pair as the total claim is necessarily lower than the number of units available (40 units). Each subject will receive the number of units he claimed to account B.
• If "head" is drawn, there is a total of 12 units available from account B.
The number of unit received from account B depends on the total claim to account B.
If the total claim to B is lower or equal than 12 units, there is enough units for both subjects in a pair and each subject will receive the number of units he claimed to account B.
If the total claim to B is strictly higher than 12 units, the following rule applies.
You don't know neither the outcome of the coin flip neither the decision of the other when you are taking your decision.
Your gain is equal to: Number of units received from A ×(1 − 0, 2) + Number of units received from B ×1
Rationing rule [only one rule is presented to each subject] NA No units is received from account B PROP The 12 available units are shared proportionally to each subject's claim to account B. The number of units received is rounded to one decimal.
You will receive from account B:
The other will receive from account B:
CEA There are two possible cases:
-If each member of your pair has claimed 6 units or more from account B: Each subject receive half of the available units (6 units).
-If one of the member of your pair has claimed less than 6 units from account B and the other has claim more than 6 units: The subject that has claimed less than 6 units receive the number of units he claimed. The subject that has claimed more than 6 units receive the remaining units: 12 -claim of the other to B.
CEL The excess demand is the difference between the total claim to account B (B 1 + B 2 ) and the number of units available from B (12). Each suject receive his claim minus a share of the excess demand. • If the result of the coin flip is "tail", the number of units available is 40 and there is enough units to satisfy the claims of the two members of the pair. • If the result of the coin flip is " head", the number of units available is 12 and there is not enough units to satisfy the claims of the two members of the pair. 
Prediction
One of your prediction may be selected for payment at the end of the experiment (you'll be paid for either a decision of part 1, 2 or 3 or a prediction of part 3).
If a prediction is selected for payment, your earnings in Euros will depend on your prediction error. Your error is the difference between the number of units claimed to B by the other and your prediction.
The below table describes the earnings according to your prediction error.
Earnings for a prediction
Prediction error (number of units) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 ≥7 Earnings (in Euros) 20 19.5 18 15.5 12 7.5 2 0
Example: Your choice is (A;B)=(20;0) and the choice of the other is (A;B)=(14;6). Your prediction is that the other will claim 10 units. Your prediction error is 4 units. If this prediction is selected for payment, your gain is 12 Euros.
Information available before taking your decision
Before taking a decision, you can use a simulator. You'll need to indicate the number of units you want to claim to B and the number of units claimed to B by the other. You can choose if you want to know your gain in the " head" or " tail" case. The calculator will return the number of units you receive from each account and your gain.
You have also access to your decisions and results for previous periods. The history Table gives you your claim to account A, your claim to account B, the total claim to B, your gain in each scenario, your prediction, your prediction error and your gain for the prediction in each of the previous period.
Results provided after each period
Once all the subjects have made their decisions, you will learn: the total claim to account B, your gain in Euros if " head" is drawn, your gain in Euros if " tail" is drawn, your prediction error and your gain in Euros for the prediction. Nash Equilibria (bi*;b-i*) NA (12;0)(11;1)(10;2)(9;3)(8;4)(7;5)(6;6)(5;7)(4;8)(3;9)(2;10)(1;11)(0;12) CEA (6;6) CEL (12;0)(11;1)(10;2)(9;3)(8;4)(7;5)(6;6)(5;7)(4;8)(3;9)(2;10)(1;11)(0;12) PROP (7;5)(6;6)(5;7)
Note: The risk-dominant equilibria are in bold. The risk-dominant equilibria are those who minimize the risk for each player, the least risky decision being the one with the greatest number of possible strategies resulting in it being the best response. I apply the definition of risk-dominance based on Nash products given by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) to determine which of the multiple Nash equilibria are risk dominant: an equilibrium is risk dominant if the Nash Product (product of the surpluses generated through successful coordination) of that equilibrium is greater than the Nash Product of every other equilibrium. Note that the total gains being equal for all equilibria, there is no Pareto-dominant equilibrium among all the possible Nash equilibria. Note: Best-Resp frequency is computed as the percentage of subjects that best respond to their prediction on the other's demand. Note: The pairwise estimates use the rows as the comparison base. The first number reported is the U statistic from the two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (or the F statistic for the variance test). The second number in parenthesis is the p-value of the two-sided test. 
Note:
Error: difference between predicted claim of the other and observed claim Deviation BR: difference between claim to B and best-response claim to B order = RS: dummy =1 if the risk aversion is elicited before strategic uncertainty aversion Nb of periods =10: dummy=1 if the total number of periods is 10
